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4ABSTRACT
The crisis and stagnation in Indian agriculture have persisted for
over a decade and are not showing any signs of reversal. Falling real
product prices faced by primary commodity producers have been one of
the central causes for escalating farm indebtedness.  The gradual
shrinkage of formal credit institutions in rural areas has simultaneously
caused increasing dominance of private players in the credit market,
rendering producers all the more vulnerable. A class analysis of
household-level farm production data from two states reveals the pattern
of income decline and rising indebtedness in rural areas. The deleterious
implications that these processes have for future agrarian development
call for effective price stabilization operations and, in the short run, a
comprehensive debt-relief policy.
Key words: Agricultural Policy, Farm Households, House Hold Farm
Production, Price Policy
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5The period of economic reforms has witnessed the re-emergence
of indebtedness as a grave problem for the Indian peasantry. In less than
a decade since the introduction of a neo-liberal economic regime,
incidents of farmers' suicide were increasingly reported from different
corners of the country. This tragic and unprecedented phenomenon
caused by increasing debt-driven vulnerability of peasant households
started with the cotton-growers of Andhra Pradesh and gradually afflicted
farmers in other parts of the country, primarily growers of various
commercial crops. Apart from Andhra Pradesh, there have been mass
farmer suicides in the past few years in several states including Karnataka
and Kerala in the south, Punjab in the north and Maharashtra in the
west.
Estimates made from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB)
data expose that more than 1,60,000 farmers have ended their lives over
the last decade1. The sheer magnitude of the disaster and the sustained
enquiries and publicity to the issue has culminated in the announcement
of the Agricultural Debt Waiver and Debt Relief Scheme, 2008
(henceforth ADWDRS) by the government.
Much has been written on the issue of farmer indebtedness.
Nevertheless it is worthwhile to revisit the phenomenon from the
perspective of peasant classes. A deeper look at the structure of rising
indebtedness in rural areas is necessary for the purpose of assessing its
impact on the agrarian question in the historical time-frame. The
1 Nagaraj (2008) has made detailed state-wise estimates of farmer suicides
using the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) data.
6tightening constraint of debt-burdens on the surplus generated in
agricultural production and its consequent impact on agrarian
development needs to be assessed. This exercise is all the more
indispensable once we recognize that the incidents of farmer suicides
are clearly the extreme manifestation of debt-driven vulnerability. The
agricultural production in other regions, where farm suicides are not
occurring in multitudes, is not necessarily unconstrained by debt-
burdens. The variance in the economic and socio-political structures
across regions is more the reason why the symptoms of spiralling
indebtedness have been divergent in their extent athwart the country.
In this context, this paper attempts to appraise the extent of the
constraint of credit relations on agricultural production and its differential
impact across peasant classes. Additionally, the analysis of the structure
of rural indebtedness across peasant classes and size-class groups reveal
the significance of a debt-relief policy in the current context and also
brings out some of the shortcomings of the ADWDRS announced recently
by the government.  For this purpose, we have used household-level
farm production data collected in 2006 through a primary field enquiry
in three regions, one in West Bengal and two in Andhra Pradesh.
The two central macroeconomic processes that have caused the
emergence of high rural indebtedness under the new economic regime
are increasing volatility of output prices of primary products following
trade liberalization and the gradual shrinkage of formal credit in rural
areas as part of the financial liberalization. A glance at these issues
before we focus on our household level analysis will substantially
enhance the comprehension of the subject at hand.
Economic reforms, macroeconomic processes and agriculture:
With the opening up of food and other crop markets, Indian farmers
have been exposed to the highly fluctuating world prices. The world
prices of primary products declined since the mid-nineties till around
7the end of the millennium as a result of an excess supply in the world
market. The falling prices adversely affected the farmers in India and
across the developing countries, especially those who had shifted to the
cultivation of commercial crops, entailing large investments. The strategy
of producing and exporting commercial crops and importing food at
cheaper prices did not succeed due to the price trends in the world
market during this period. Food prices also declined towards the end of
the nineties, but at a far lower rate than the primary product prices.
On the other hand, the primary product prices started rising since
the turn of the century. Along with that food prices also increased in the
world market in the new century at least at a similar rate, if not faster. An
implication of this phenomenon for the small-scale primary producers
in the developing world (who are mostly net food buyers) was that the
real product prices they faced secularly declined over the last one and a
half decades. The rising food prices in the new century, especially the
phenomenal upsurges in global food and fuel prices witnessed in the
last couple of years, also meant that real returns in agricultural activity
in the Third World had turned even more unfavourable in recent times.
Moreover, with world prices affecting domestic prices under a trade-
liberalized regime, the returns to agricultural production started falling
even within the domestic economies, further compounding the problem
for the large rural populace in these countries.
The movements in the real producer prices in India are
unambiguously portrayed by Figure 1, where we have plotted the real
Wholesale Price Indices for different crops and product-groups for the
period between 1991-92 and 2005-06 at 1991-92 prices. We have used
the Wholesale Price Indices for Rice, Wheat, Maize and Raw Cotton
and product groups like pulses and oilseeds available in the various
reports of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP).
The nominal price indices have been deflated using the Consumer price
Index for Agricultural labourers (CPI-AL).
8With certain assumptions, the real producer prices capture the
changes in the purchasing power of cultivators. The trends in the
wholesale price indices deflated by the CPI-AL represents the changes
in the capacity of the producers to purchase a particular commodity
basket over time, subject to the assumptions that the costs of cultivation
as a share of output, and the output share appropriated by middlemen
and commission agents, have remained more or less unchanged with
time. The first assumption is a particularly strong one since
deregulation of input markets under the neo-liberal economic regime
have pushed up prices of seeds and chemical inputs significantly. The
individual crops and product groups for which we have carried out
this exercise covers around 70 percent of the Gross Cropped Area in
2005-06 and hence our findings are relevant for a majority of the
cultivators in the country.
The real producer prices for rice remained stable throughout the
nineties but experienced a surge in the late nineties. However, this gain
quickly tapered off in the new century and the real prices reached the
early nineties level due to stagnated nominal prices and higher inflation.
In contrast, real producer prices for wheat sharply increased initially
when the economy was opened up in the mid-nineties and again towards
the end of the decade. However, similar to rice, the real producer prices
for wheat also stagnated during 1999-2001 and experienced a downturn
in the period thereafter. Similar trends are visible for pulses. Their real
producer prices have declined fast post 2001-02 to the early nineties
levels after a brief upsurge at the turn of the century. On the other hand,
the trend for maize has been more volatile, declining significantly in
the early nineties followed by occasional upturns. Significantly, the
real producer prices for maize have consistently remained below the
1991-92 level throughout the period.
9Figure 1:  Trends in real Wholesale Price Indices for different
     commodities (at 1991-92 prices)
Source: Based on Wholesale Price Index data published in various reports
of the CACP.
Note: The period of analysis for pulses is 1993-94 to 2005-06 as the
price indices for Pulses as a group are not available for the years
1991-92 and 1992-93.
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The trends for the real producer prices for the non-food crops are
significantly different from what we detect for the food crops. The real
producer prices for oilseeds have secularly declined in the nineties to
low levels. The subsequent rise after 2000-01 was more due to inadequate
supply and poor quality production, owing mainly to the drought
conditions in the early years of the new century.  This implies that no
real benefits accrued to producers of oilseeds due to this increase in real
producer prices. This increase also got partially reversed in the last three
years of the period of analysis. Raw Cotton, which has been the focus of
the debate on the agrarian crisis in the country, exhibits an unambiguous
declining trend in real producer prices ever since the markets were
liberalized in the mid-nineties. From a high in 1994-95, the real prices
in the new century dwindled fast and even slipped below the low point
in 1992-93.
These price trends for the major non-food crops explicitly reveal
a more systemic income deflationary process under trade-
liberalization rather than mere intermittent shocks. For food crops,
there is a clear erosion of real value of prices from around the year
2000. The positive effect of increasing nominal prices in the current
decade has been nullified by relatively high consumer prices. We
have assumed that the costs of cultivation as a share of output have
remained more or less unchanged with time. In the event of rising
cultivation costs in agriculture unlike what we have assumed, the
decline in the purchasing power of the producers would be even
greater than what we observe from the graphs. A basic implication of
these trends is the necessity to stabilize both food and non-food
prices. This calls for increased interventions in markets of both food
and non-food commodities in the form of enhanced procurement and
distribution operations in a manner that improves the net purchasing
power of the primary sector producers.
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Financial liberalization is the other facet of the current economic
regime, which is equally responsible for mounting rural household debts.
The path of financial reform adopted under the aegis of the Narasimhan
Committee constituted in 1991 ensured a gradual shrinkage of the
coverage of institutional banking sector in the rural areas. The
committee's efforts to redefine and gradually phase out priority sector
lending norms led to an immediate decline in the volume of priority
sector lending by banks  in the first half of the nineties. Even when
lending under the caption ‘priority sector’  increased, the redefinition of
the norms to include infrastructure funds, special bonds of State Financial
Corporations and food processing companies including MNCs under
the priority sector meant that lending to agriculture continued to decline
in the late nineties and later. Significant literature discussing these issues
and their adverse impact on agriculture and the overall rural economy
are already available2.
However, a cursory look at some of the banking indicators for
Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs) show that more than 3000 rural
bank branches were branded ‘inefficient’ and eventually closed down
between 1991 and 2005 (Table 1). The percentage of rural branches to
total branches started decreasing post-1991; by 2005, the figure was
45.7 percent, even lower than that in 1981. Similarly, the percentage of
credit advanced in rural areas to total credit increased from 11.9 to 14.7
between 1981 and 1991 and dipped sharply to 9.5 percent by 2005.
While the Credit-Deposit ratio remained more or less unchanged in the
eighties, it sizably declined from 59.4 percent in 1991 to 39 percent in
2 The shrinkage of bank operations in rural areas as a result of the Narasimhan
Committee recommendations and in particular, the decline of priority
sector lending to agriculture, has been discussed and documented
comprehensively in Ramachandran and Swaminathan (2002) and
Chandrasekhar (2004).
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2001. After 2001, this ratio shows a steep increase and rises to 51.6
percent by 2005. However, this offers no solace as it is more due to a
slower growth of rural deposits (in nominal terms) than rural credit for
SCBs; a joint outcome of aggressive financial reforms and the
precipitating agrarian crisis.
A systematic erosion of institutional banking services in rural
areas and unfavourable returns from cultivation has worked in tandem
in several parts of the country to enhance manifold the vulnerability of
rural households to local moneylenders. Keeping these two broad
macroeconomic processes in mind, we will analyze the production
outcomes of agricultural activity using our primary field enquiry data.
Field enquiry and Classification of Households:
The field enquiry was conducted between February and August in
2006. Household-level disaggregated crop-wise and farm operation-
wise data on labour-use and input costs, output volumes and prices,
outstanding loan details, owned and operational land holdings and
asset ownership were collected. Data was also collected on paid-
employment, both farm and non-farm, regular and casual wages and
income generated from self-employed activities. This enabled us to
estimate the farm incomes as well as total household incomes taking
into account the various non-farm income sources.
The survey covered three diverse agro-climatic regions with
varying economic and social structures allowing us to assess the
situations of rural indebtedness under dissimilar production conditions
in agriculture. The two villages surveyed in West Bengal, situated in the
Raina-II (WB-rn) block in Bardhaman district, lie in the fertile Gangetic
plains. Owing to abundance of groundwater in the region, the extent of
irrigation is high and facilitates multiple cropping in a year. Paddy
(aman) and potato are the main crops cultivated. There is also some
extent of paddy (boro) cultivation in this region. The two regions
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surveyed in Andhra Pradesh are Saidapur mandal (AP-sdp) in the
Karimnagar district and Anantapur (rural) mandal (AP-atp) in Anantapur
district. Three villages are surveyed in the Saidapur mandal. They consist
primarily of households growing cotton, and around half of their operated
area is irrigated. Compared to the West Bengal region, the extent of
irrigation is lower in this region and cultivation is undertaken mainly in
one season. In contrast, the Anantapur region is agriculturally the most
backward among the three regions, has negligible irrigation and is
characterized by dryland groundnut cultivation. Henceforth, we will for
convenience refer to the three regions as WB-rn, AP-sdp and AP-atp.
A stratified random sampling methodology is used to draw samples
for the survey. The stratification is done on the basis of operated area in
order to prevent an exclusion of households with large land-holdings,
which due to their thinness always contains the possibility of being left
out when a simple random sampling is employed. In WB-rn, the two
strata are defined by extent of operated area i.e., households below 5
acres of operated area and those above that. In AP-sdp and AP-atp, the
two strata are determined by households operating below and above 12
acres. The precise reason for using different criteria for stratification
across the states is due to the significant difference in the average size of
land holding. The strata were arrived at after analyzing the house-listing
data and demarcating the operational holding size above which the top
10 per cent households were placed. The selected sample size in WB-rn
is 77 households, while it is 60 households each in AP-sdp and AP-atp
regions.
We have used Patnaik's Labour Exploitation Index (E-Criterion)
to classify the households into six economic classes. The calculation of
the Labour Exploitation Index (E) for each household (see equation 1)
has been done considering both direct labour exploitation through hiring-
in and hiring-out as well as indirect labour exploitation of through
leasing-out and leasing-in of land using the following equation-
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E = X/F = [(Hi - Ho) + (Lo - Li)]/F….………..…………………. (1)
where, Hi, Ho respectively are labour days hired-in and hired-out,
Lo , Li  respectively are the total labour days on land leased-out and land
leased-in and F is the family labour in self-employment. X is therefore
the net direct and indirect exploitation of others' labour. E represents the
exploitation of others' labour relative to the exploitation of one's own
labour (Patnaik, 1976). The economic classes into which the households
have been classified are rural labour (RL), poor peasant (PP), small peasant
(SP), middle peasant (MP), rich peasant (RP) and landlords (LLD). The
range in which the value of E lies determined the breaking up of each
class (See Table 2).
Table 2:  Details of Economic Classification
Economic Class Value of E Comments
Rural labour E = - ∞          X < 0 and |X| is very large, F = 0.
Poor Peasant E ≤  - 1 X < 0, F > 0, |X| is large and |X| ≥ F.
Small Peasant 0 ≥  E > - 1 X ≤ 0, F > 0 and |X| < F.
Middle Peasant 1 > E > 0 X > 0, F > 0 and X < F.
Rich Peasant E ≥ 1 X > 0, F > 0, X is large and X ≥ F.
Landlord E = ∞ X > 0 and X is very large, F = 0.
Source: Adopted from Patnaik (1976)
The poor and small peasants are the labour hiring-out classes,
constituting the lower peasantry, while the middle and rich peasant are
the labour exploiting classes and belong to the upper strata of the
peasantry. At the two ends of the classification lie the rural labour and
the landlord classes. Both these classes do not toil on their fields and
have a nil F. The rural labour class hires out large quantum of their
labour in the labour market due to lack of any operational holdings
while the landlord class hire in large amount of labour for cultivation on
their operated area or leases out land to tenants in exchange of ground
rent. In the historical time-frame of a capitalist transition of agriculture,
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it is the upper peasantry classes, along with the proto-capitalist
landlords3, which appropriate surplus labour directly through an
'unequal exchange' in the labour market or indirectly through other
exploitative relations, and lead the process of capital accumulation.
Alternatively, the households have also been grouped into six land
size-classes - starting with zero or nil operated area and moving up to the
size-class operating more than 10 acres. The classification according to
operated area size-class is a straight-forward exercise based on the primary
data collected on owned area, area leased-in and area leased-out. The
operated area is the sum of owned area and the net area leased-in.
Table 3: Distribution of Households across economic and size-classes
in the three regions
(in percent)
Class WB-rn AP-sdp AP-atp
RL 2.6 11.7 3.3
PP 32.5 11.7 41.7
SP 5.2 41.7 16.7
MP 20.8 20.0 20.0
RP 39.0 13.3 15.0
LLD 0.0 1.7 3.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Acres
0 2.6 10.0 0.0
0.01-1.0 53.2 18.3 1.7
1.01-2.5 24.7 16.7 21.7
2.51-5.0 11.7 30.0 31.7
5.1-10.0 3.9 16.7 21.7
10.1 & above 3.9 8.3 23.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Primary Field Enquiry
3 The proto-capitalist landlords are those who primarily undertake cultivation
on their land by employing large quantum of hired labour and farm-
servants. The other category of landlords is the ones who primarily lease-
out land in exchange of ground-rent.
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Some basic characteristics of the households in the three regions
are revealed by their distribution across economic and size-classes
(Table 3).  In WB-rn, a significant feature of the sample is the small size of
land holdings. A large 77.9 percent of the households operate between
0.01 and 2.5 acres and another 11.7 percent of the households lie in the
2.51-5.0 acres bracket. While land holdings have been historically smaller
in West Bengal, a persistent land reforms programme has also ensured that
large land holdings above the ceiling are not very common. The other
striking feature of this region is that the rich peasants form the largest
economic class, close to around 39 percent, much higher than in the other
two regions. High levels of labour demand in this region originate from
the cultivation of two to three crops in a year. Local labour supply alone
is not sufficient to meet this demand and dependence on migration of
labour from other parts of the state happens to be necessary. This sizeable
net hiring-in of labour is obviously a major reason for the high proportion
of rich peasant class in this region. Interestingly, the labour-exploiting
upper peasantry here is larger in size than the lower peasantry. A significant
point to note is that the rich peasant households are distributed across all
size-classes, which means that the high demand for labour is being
generated from both small and large land-holdings.
In AP-sdp, the distribution of the households across land size-
classes is more spread out. The percentage of households operating 5
acres (2 hectares) and above in this region is a significant 25 percent.
The small peasant class is the largest class in the region with 41.67
percent of the households. Unlike WB-rn, the rich peasant class is not
only thinner (13.33 percent) but is also confined to the two highest size-
class brackets (5 acres and above). The small and middle peasant classes
jointly comprise more than sixty percent of the households. This
indicates that although the region primarily grows commercial crops,
the use of family labour is at least as important as hired labour for a
significant number of households.
18
Finally in AP-atp, we find a large size of net labour-selling, lower
peasantry classes. The poor peasant and small peasant classes
respectively are 41.67 percent and 16.67 percent of the households.
This is a clear indication of the higher levels of hiring-out of labour in
this agriculturally backward region. Cross-classifying the households
between economic and size-classes reveals that as much as 28 percent
the poor peasant and 60 percent of small peasant class respectively are
operating more than 5 acres. In contrast, the rich peasant and the landlord
households are found to be concentrated only in the higher size-classes.
The average land holdings are also larger in this dryland region; and
around 45 percent of the households operate more than 5 acres.
Income Depression and Indebtedness in Rural Economy: A Class
Analysis
From the disaggregated cost of cultivation data and data on output
quantity and prices collected through the primary field enquiry, we
have estimated the average Farm labour Income (FLI) of the households
in each class. The FLI is determined according to the following relation
(Equation 2)-
Farm labour Income (FLI) = Gross Value of Output (GVO) - [Total
Material Input costs + Paid-out labour
costs] ………………………….  (2) 4
4 The GVO is the sum of Crop Output, By-Product and Livestock Product.
The Total Material Input costs is determined by the following relation-
Total Material Input Costs =   [Sf + Livestock Feedf + Mf] + [Sp +
Livestock Feedp + Livestock Maintenancep
+ Mp + Fp + Fuelsp + Irrigation chargesp + Pp
+ Service chargesp] + Amortization cost.
where ‘S’, ‘M’, ‘F’ and ‘P’ denotes seed, manure, fertilizers and pesticides
respectively. The suffixes ‘f’ and ‘p’ denotes farm-produced inputs and
purchased inputs respectively. The total paid-out labour costs comprise of
wages paid in both cash and kind. The yearly amortization cost for
productive assets has been derived by a straight-line depreciation exercise
based on the data on expected life of these assets.
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Total Household Income' (THI') = [FLI - Rent Payments] + Income
from Paid-employment + Income from
Self-employment  ........................... (3)5
Total Household Income (THI) = [FLI - Rent Payments - Interest
payments (OIP)] + Income from Paid-
employment + Income from Self-
employment  ........................................ (4)
The FLI represents the income of the farm households from
cultivation in an economic situation where there is a complete absence
of monopoly over land and credit. This renders both the ground rent and
interest payment as zero. Here, by monopoly, we indicate the control of
productive resources by non-producers in the economy. As both land
and credit are key inputs in agricultural production, the ownership of
these inputs by non-producers who also charge a return for use of these
inputs in production, constitutes a kind of monopoly by non-producer
agents over productive inputs. For each economic and size-class, we
have an average household FLI. In order to assess the impact of credit
monopoly on the production process under the real situation, we look at
the share of the FLI that is required to clear all Outstanding Interest
Payments (OIP) for the average household in each class across the regions
(Table 4.1 to 4.3). The OIP is the accumulated interest from all unpaid
loans including those taken in previous production cycle(s). The payment
of ground rent also critically influenced the income situation of some
lower peasantry classes in the Andhra Pradesh regions but we shall not
5 As very few households were receiving ground rent by leasing-out land
and/or collecting service charges by renting-out their productive capital,
we have merged both these in the category of income from self employment
for the sake of convenience. Rent and service charges are returns
respectively to the ownership right of land and productive capital and are
usually not placed under the category of income.
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go into the details of that within the scope of this paper. We have also
estimated the Total Household Income, prior to making interest payments
(THI'), and after making interest payments (THI) for the average household
in each class (see Equations 3 and 4).
From Table 4.1 to 4.3, we can observe the diverse production
situations across the regions. While the share of FLI required to clear all
OIP is around 35 percent in WB-rn, the corresponding figure is almost
74 percent in the cotton-growing AP-sdp. In contrast, the situation is
exorbitant in AP-atp, where the OIP exceeds the FLI for the region as a
whole by more than 60 percent of the FLI. The constraint of accumulated
indebtedness of the households on their agricultural production is of
varying degrees across regions. It is more stringent or even prohibitive
for the commercial crop growers in the Andhra Pradesh regions. One can
argue that often a portion of the credit taken is diverted for consumption
or for non-agricultural purposes and it is not necessary that the entire
interest payments have to be made from the FLI alone. However, even
after taking into account the income from other sources apart from
cultivation, the situation still remains tight with the OIP constituting a
high 61.53 percent in AP-sdp and 75.5 percent in AP-atp of the THI'.
We are assessing accumulated indebtedness from a class
perspective. We find that both classes of lower peasantry in WB-rn
generate an FLI which is short of meeting their interest payments (Table
4.1). However, the cases of the poor peasants and the small peasants are
distinct from each other. The average THI or THI' of the poor peasant
class in WB-rn is closer to the rural proletariat in their character; and
labour-selling is the primary source of their income. Consequently, the
OIP for this class forms only a modest 8 percent of their THI'. On the
other hand, the small peasant class is beleaguered with a negative FLI as
their average Gross Value of Output (GVO) does not cover the material
and labour input costs incurred in cultivation of their land. This is
primarily due to unusually lower than average physical yield of both
21
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paddy and potato for this class. Such erratic variation is plausible given
that this class is thin and comprises of only 4 households. However,
these few households were doubly plagued by a high OIP also. The
labour-exploiting upper peasantry classes, which constitute a majority
of households in WB-rn, are comparatively in a much more comfortable
situation as far as their pending interest obligations are concerned.
In AP-sdp (Table 4.2), the small and middle peasants are unable to
cover their OIP through the FLI generated from agricultural activities.
The middle peasant class is not able to clear the OIP even after making
use of their non-cultivation or non-farm incomes. The share of the FLI
that is depleted in the process of clearing the OIP is high not only for the
poor peasant class but disturbingly high for the rich peasant class (71.5
percent) as well. Unlike WB-rn, a tight constraint on production emerging
out of credit relations is not restricted to the lower peasantry alone, but
is also seriously afflicting the middle and rich peasant classes in this
region. In fact, the rich peasant class which generates a sizeable FLI
(more than a lakh) from cultivation are left with a disposable income
after payment of interest that barely allows them to meet minimum
consumption norms, leave alone the question of further investments
and their role in capital accumulation. The sole landlord household
seems to be the only one that is at ease in the credit market. An
investigation into the structure of the credit market will throw more
light on this phenomenon, where labour-exploiting classes are found to
be critically vulnerable with regard to the credit exchange relations
they face.
We come across a worse scenario in agricultural production in the
unirrigated dryland region of AP-atp. The interest obligations for the
poor and middle peasants are stunningly high at 4 to 5 times their FLI,
pointing that these classes are experiencing acute distress due to
indebtedness and depressed returns to agricultural activity. Besides in
this region, we find that a horrendously high portion (86.5 percent) of
23
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the FLI is required to clear the OIP for the rich peasant class. The fact
that the proto-capitalist landlords also have OIP exceeding their FLI
indicates that the debt-driven infirmity of agricultural production is
more intensive and widespread in this region. The field investigations
revealed the existence of bonded labour, which is used as a mode of
repayment in the credit market for past indebtedness. In fact, the
astronomical OIP figure that we observe for the only household in the
0.01-1.00 acre bracket is only the imputed money valuation of the
outstanding interest. But that is not really relevant as the unpaid monetary
debts are being settled by regular recompense in the form of dedicated
physical labour-hours to the creditor.
From the point of view of the larger agrarian question, two distinct
effects can be traced. For majority of the classes undertaking cultivation,
including some from the upper peasantry, it is difficult to carry out even
a simple peasant economy reproduction. The THI of these classes are
abysmally low, and clearly is not adequate to meet the minimum
consumption requirements of the households. A default in interest
payments and simultaneous reduction of own-consumption to sub-
standard nutrition levels are really the strategies of survival (or death)
for these classes. The intensity of this income decline is illustrated by
the spread of this insufficiency or shortfall amongst the labour-exploiting
middle peasant classes in all three regions and also the rich peasants and
landlords in the agriculturally backward AP-atp; the middle peasants in
both regions in Andhra Pradesh actually end up with annual losses. This
non-viability of even a simple peasant economy reproduction is reflected
in the mass farmer suicides that we have witnessed in the country for a
long time now.
On the other hand, the rare cases of classes that retain considerable
surplus from agricultural production are the rich peasant classes in WB-
rn and AP-sdp, and the sole landlord household in AP-sdp. The
households in these classes appropriate significant volumes of surplus
25
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labour through the use of modern and capitalist modes of production.
However, the income they generate from agriculture and allied activities
is insufficient even for these upper peasantry households to undertake
large investments and upgrade their cultivation techniques without
cutting down their consumption requirements to a certain extent. The
following simple exercise illustrates this fact.
We calculate the Monthly Per Capita Income (MPCI)6, from the
annual THI, for the average households in the rich peasant classes in
WB-rn and AP-sdp and compare them with the Monthly Per Capita
Expenditure (MPCE) required to attain certain minimum consumption
standards. The average family size of households in these classes is 7.03
in WB-rn and 4.75 in AP-sdp respectively (Primary Field Enquiry). On
this basis, the MPCI for the average household in WB-rn is calculated to
be Rs. 445 and for AP-sdp, Rs. 551. On the other hand, the MPCE required
for attaining a minimum per capita per diem calorie intake of 2200 Kcal,
derived using NSS data on nutritional intake, is Rs. 573 for West Bengal
and Rs. 704 for Andhra Pradesh7. The average MPCI of the rich peasants
clearly falls short of the MPCE required for minimum consumption
norms in both regions, which implies that new investments in production
techniques are feasible for these households only by reducing their
6 MPCI for ith class = [(Annual THI for ith class/12)/Average Family size for
ith class].
7 The NSS data on nutritional intake gives the per capita per diem calorie
intake by the different MPCE classes. The per capita calorie intake (y-
axis) plotted against the Average Per Capita Expenditure or APCE (x-axis)
for each MPCE class reveals a direct relationship between the two. This
relationship allows us to determine the expenditure level that achieves any
particular calorie intake norm. We arrive at these figures for West Bengal
and Andhra Pradesh by doing this exercise using the 61st NSS round data
on nutritional intake (Report No. 513) and applying a norm of 2200 Kcal.
A calorie intake norm of 2200 Kcal is chosen as that was the norm used
for estimating the official poverty line of 1973-74, after the
recommendations of the 1979 Task Force. For further insight on the issue,
see Patnaik (2007).
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consumption below the required levels and/or by defaulting to some
extent in their interest or rent payments, mainly the former8. This largely
explains the stagnation in investment and growth in the agricultural
sector, now a persisting feature in the post-liberalization period.
The scanty returns in agriculture, accompanied by a move back of
the formal credit institutions from rural areas in the post-liberalisation
period, have pushed a large section of the peasantry to abysmally low
standards of living. It has also run down the capacity of labour-exploiting
dominant peasant classes to further the process of capitalist development.
While intra-peasantry relations of exploitation continue to operate
through unequal exchange in the labour or land-lease markets, these
above-mentioned macroeconomic processes has nearly stalled the
capitalist development of agriculture as a whole. It is precisely due to
this that an immense debt relief programme is an urgent necessity and
holds high significance for further agrarian development. A look into
the characteristics and conditions of indebtedness across the regions
and classes further elaborates this situation. At the same time, it points
to some of the shortcomings of the recently announced debt-waiver
measures in ADWDRS in its current form.
The debt situation of the households in the three regions is
presented in the Tables 5.1 to 5.3. The overall outstanding debt per
household (the sum of the outstanding principal and outstanding
interest) is double or even more in both regions of Andhra Pradesh
compared to WB-rn. An inter-regional comparison of the Debt-Assets
ratio9  and the OIP-GVO ratio (Outstanding Interest Payments/Gross
Value of Output) gives a stronger illustration of the disparity in the debt
8 Rent payments for this class in both WB-rn and AP-sdp are small and
insignificant.
9 Assets comprise of buildings, livestock, means of production and transport
and consumer durables of the households. The land assets and other
financial assets are not included while computing the Debt-Asset ratio.
28
situation among the regions. The debt-assets ratio in AP-sdp is 0.66,
high by any standard, while in AP-atp, it is 0.38. Comparatively, this
ratio is lower at 0.22 in WB-rn. Similarly, the OIP-GVO ratio is 0.074 in
WB-rn, much lower than 0.240 in AP-sdp and 0.227 in AP-atp. This
emphatically points out the high volumes of debt-burdens that have
come to exist in the commercial crop-growing regions under the neo-
liberal policy regime.
Inspecting the situation through the lens of the different peasant
classes, we find that the small peasant and the rich peasant classes in
WB-rn have a higher than average outstanding debt (Table 5.1). For the
rich peasant class, the debt-assets ratio and OIP-GVO ratio are all slightly
less than the average for the region indicating that the class is carrying
a debt burden that is commensurate with its assets and production.
However, the small peasant class shoulders unusually high debt-assets
ratio and OIP-GVO ratio. This class, although quite thin, is definitely
ailing from a high level of accumulated debts. From the size-class
classification, we find that the marginal farmers (0.01 to 1.0 acres), the
majority in the region, also have a high OIP-GVO ratio of 0.213. Although
the indicators which are used to measure the extent of the overall debt-
burden in the region do not reveal the presence of any acute indebtedness
problem, there are definitely traces of debt-driven vulnerability among
the marginal cultivators and the small peasants.
We have already seen that in AP-sdp the upper peasantry classes,
like the lower classes, are also facing tight constraints in the domain of
credit exchange relations. The figures for both debt-assets ratio and
OIP-GVO ratio for the different classes in this region authenticate this
observation (Table 5.2). The outstanding debt as a percentage of physical
assets was not less than 50 percent for any of the four peasant classes.
The middle and rich peasants are having phenomenally high debt-assets
ratios of 0.70 and 0.81. A more or less similar picture emerges for AP-atp.
Here too, their debt-assets and OIP-GVO ratios do not reveal a marked
distinction between the lower and upper peasantry classes (Table 5.3).
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Table 5.1:  Household Debt Situation across classes: WB-rn
Class Outstanding Debt-Assets OIP-GVO
Debt per  Ratio Ratio
household
RL 8400 0.70 0.103
PP 5484 0.15 0.105
SP 44669 1.25 0.297
MP 18564 0.30 0.064
RP 58255 0.21 0.067
LLD 0 0.00 0.000
All Classes 30873 0.22 0.074
0 8400 0.70 0.103
0.01-1.0 13547 0.34 0.213
1.01-2.5 26274 0.34 0.063
2.51-5.0 49899 0.34 0.054
5.1-10.0 42694 0.09 0.014
10.1 & above 242872 0.16 0.041
All Classes 30873 0.22 0.074
Source: Same as Table 3
Table 5.2: Household Debt Situation across classes: AP-sdp
Class Outstanding Debt-Assets OIP-GVO
Debt per  Ratio Ratio
household
RL 18479 1.06 0.000
PP 22020 0.61 0.203
SP 26434 0.53 0.141
MP 69014 0.70 0.211
RP 185181 0.81 0.323
LLD 388000 0.43 0.064
All Classes 60699 0.66 0.240
0 20833 3.16 0.000
0.01-1.0 14769 0.38 0.853
1.01-2.5 30039 0.50 0.460
2.51-5.0 38892 0.71 0.100
5.1-10.0 77195 0.60 0.126
10.1 & above 316420 0.72 0.285
All Classes 60699 0.66 0.240
Source: Same as Table 3
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Table 5.3:   Household Debt Situation across classes: AP-atp
Class Outstanding Debt-Assets OIP-GVO
Debt per  Ratio Ratio
 household
RL 6600 0.14 0.000
PP 50738 0.87 0.575
SP 45663 0.32 0.071
MP 69345 0.33 0.183
RP 119123 0.42 0.217
LLD 205100 0.16 0.086
All Classes 67546 0.38 0.227
0 0 0.00 0.000
0.01-1.0 198080 198.08 48.453
1.01-2.5 38240 0.61 0.903
2.51-5.0 34625 0.42 0.113
5.1-10.0 69730 0.25 0.079
10.1 & above 128083 0.38 0.242
All Classes 67546 0.38 0.227
Source: Same as Table 3
Interestingly the susceptibility to huge debt-burdens in both these
regions, as distinct from WB-rn, is not restricted to the lower size-classes
(below 2 hectare or 5 acres, 1 ha. = 2.5 acres approx.). The average
household in the two topmost size-classes in AP-sdp have quite high
debt-assets ratios. Also, the high OIP-GVO ratio of the cultivators with
operated area of more than 10 acres in AP-atp at 0.242 is not surprising,
since we are aware that around 21 percent of these households actually
belonged to lower peasantry classes. Glancing back at the income
situations (Table 4.2 and 4.3), we can observe that the OIP ate up into a
high share of or even exceeded the FLI or the THI' for the two size-
classes above 2 hectares in both the Andhra Pradesh regions. This actually
points to the irrationality of the unilateral differentiation ADWDRS has
adopted while waiving outstanding debts between farmers operating
less than 2 hectares and those operating more than that. Typically in
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dryland or less irrigated areas commercial crop cultivation is more and
the size of land holding is larger. Moreover, given the character of the
current crisis in agriculture emanating from market risks associated with
high output, households with larger operated area are not necessarily
always better-off compared to the smaller cultivators. A household
investing large outlay in commercial crop cultivation has to bear  larger
risks especially when the output prices are systemically unfavourable
over a time period. In such a situation, the provision of a 'one time
settlement' in the ADWDRS for farmers operating more than 2 hectares
may not be adequate to salvage their sinking production systems.
The prevalent practice in the credit market, especially in case of
institutional credit, is to repay the interest annually on a loan, and to
renew the loan for the next year. The failure of a household to clear the
interest annually forces it to obtain new loans from newer sources (often
from private ones) with the objectives of carrying on production as well
as to discharge the old debts. Repeated failures of this nature for a few
production cycles lead to the accumulation of debts to such a high
magnitude that the annual interest costs become unmanageably large.
The share of the interest component in the total outstanding debt also
exceeds the interest rate at which the credit was originally available due
to lack of timely repayments. In such a situation, unless there is a marked
jump in the returns to production, the interest costs continue to eat up
larger and larger shares of the output every year.
The interest rate structure of credit itself exhibits large differences
across regions. The average rate of interest on the loans taken by our
sample households in the three regions is shown in Table 6. The rate is
extremely high at 19.73 percent per annum in AP-sdp compared to the
other two regions. The obvious reason is the higher share of non-
institutional loans among all loans in this region. The higher interest
rate in this region vis-à-vis the other regions indirectly reflects the interest
rate gap that exists between the institutional and non-institutional credit
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markets. The interest rate on loans from private sources in all the regions
is found to be at least 24 percent per annum and in certain cases is as
high as 60 percent. In contrast, the interest rate in the three regions for
different sources of institutional loans hovered between 9 and 12 percent p.a.
Table 6: Number of loans, average interest rate and interest
component of outstanding dues: All regions
WB-rn AP-sdp AP-atp
No. of loans, of which 92 71 104
Institutional 75 27 78
Non-institutional 17 44 26
Average interest rate (p.a.) 14.64 19.73 13.82
Share of Interest in total
outstanding cash dues (%) 16.18 27.48 22.29
Source: Same as Table 3
A comparison of the percentage share of interest in total
outstanding cash dues of the households with the average interest rate
prevailing in a region reveals the extent of default in interest payments
in the short run. From Table 6, we observe that the overall interest
component of the outstanding household debt in WB-rn at 16.18 percent
is marginally higher than the average rate of interest (14.64 percent) of
this region. This clearly indicates that a drastic build up of household
interest costs with time is not much in this region. The converse is of
course true for the other two regions. The share of outstanding interest
in total debt is 27.48 percent in AP-sdp and 22.29 percent in AP-atp.
This exceeds the average interest rate by 7.75 percentage points for AP-
sdp and 8.47 percentage points for AP-atp; an unambiguous evidence of
the high rates of failure on part of the households to clear their interest
commitments yearly.
This brings us to the issue of sources of credit to the different classes
and the differential access to formal credit across classes. The percentage
33
break-up of outstanding household debt for each class by source of credit,
presented in Table 7, reveals the structure of credit markets in the three
regions. The access to institutional credit in AP-sdp is woefully inadequate
with only 23.63 percent of the total debt being owed to formal sources.
Although there is a trend of increasing access to institutional credit as we
move up the peasant class hierarchy, the actual extent of such access is
quite poor across classes in comparison to their requirements. The high
pressure of interest repayments exerted on household income that we
noted earlier can be significantly reduced by providing greater access to
the formal credit market with a lower interest rate structure.
This region is located in Telengana, one of the earliest casualties
of trade liberalization. The volatility of world cotton prices in the mid-
nineties adversely affected the cultivators here. The high default in
interest payments by the cultivators, following the initial downturn in
prices, led the banks to stop giving credit to them. This made it possible
and easy for the private players to capture the credit market in the latter
half of the nineties and charge exorbitant interest rates. Additionally the
introduction of the expensive pest-resistant GM cotton plant 'Bollgard'
in late nineties and its subsequent failure to decrease pesticide costs by
anything worth the saying further aggravated the grim situation of the
farmers. Within a few years, the Telengana region was converted into a
zone of debt-driven farmer suicides.
The dominance of informal credit in AP-atp is comparatively much
less taking into account the proximity of the region to the district
headquarters, where commercial and cooperative banks were located.
However, a distinct difference across classes can be observed in this
region. While the upper peasantry classes are accessing around three-
fourth of their credit from institutional sources, more than half of the
credit requirements of the lower peasant classes are catered to by informal
sources. Our field investigation revealed that the groundnut growers
received average prices around Rs. 1460 per quintal (certain cultivators
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were found to be selling their crop for as low a price as Rs. 800 or
Rs.1000 per quintal), which was clearly inadequate for covering the
cultivation costs, no matter what production technique was being used.
The repeated crop failures earlier in this decade due to drought conditions
had led to a soaring debt-burden, which could not be redeemed in the
subsequent production cycles due to the low output prices.
The situation in both the Andhra Pradesh regions has a serious
implication for the current debt waiver scheme announced by the
government. The ADWDRS does not cover the outstanding loans
borrowed from informal sources. According to GOI estimates, out of the
Rs. 1.12 lakh crores total cash dues of farmer households in the country
in 2003, informal sources accounted for Rs. 48000 crores or nearly 43
percent of the total debt (GOI, 2007). In view of this huge non-
institutional debt-burden, formalisation of informal debt is ardently
required. An effective way of accomplishing it is the manner in which
The Kerala Farmers' Debt Relief Commission Act, 2007 goes about it.
This Act grants special powers to the State's Debt Relief Commission to
negotiate with private creditors and fix a 'fair rate of interest' and an
'appropriate level of debt'. Given that around Rs.18000 crores of debt
from non-institutional sources carried an interest rate greater than 30 per
cent (ibid), the fixing of a 'fair rate of interest' close to the interest rates
existing in the formal credit market is a necessary and productive step.
The dominance of private players in the credit market is relatively
much less in WB-rn. Unlike in the other two regions, the high share of
institutional credit of the lower peasantry classes is the striking feature
of this region (Table 7). The existence of Adampur Cooperative Society,
a well-functioning primary agricultural cooperative society, is the reason
for the low dependence of different peasant classes on private
moneylenders. While the debt-driven vulnerability to private credit
providers is much lower in this region, we must not entirely overlook
their operations. Revisiting the data by the size-group classification, we
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can see that the marginal cultivators (0 to 1.0 acre) owed almost half
their debts to non-institutional sources. This point to the fact that the
private moneylenders are operating strongly among those sections of
the peasantry with small land-holdings and consequently limited credit-
worthiness in the formal market. Recent initiatives adopted by the
cooperative society to provide loans to Self-Help Groups, mostly formed
by women, can increasingly bring the households with limited access to
land within the fold of the institutional credit market.
Our primary findings in the different regions across the two states are
endorsed by the results of the secondary data of National Sample Survey.
According to the Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers in the 59th round
(NSSO, Report No. 498), the average outstanding loan per farmer household
in Andhra Pradesh was Rs. 23,965 in 2003, much higher than the all-India
average of Rs. 12,585. The corresponding figure for West Bengal was much
lower at Rs. 5,237. On the other hand, the Debt and Investment Survey (59th
round) revealed the much higher share of informal credit in Andhra Pradesh
(72.7 percent) compared to West Bengal (32.5 percent) in 2003. However,
this share had gone up for both the states when compared to the 48th round
results (NSSO, Report No. 420 and 501).
A more dismal feature that accompanies an increase in non-
institutional credit is the shift in the distribution of outstanding cash dues
of rural households in favour of the higher interest rate brackets. Figure 2,
which represent this distribution in Andhra Pradesh for 1991-92 and 2002-
03 reveals that more than 70 percent of the cash dues carry an interest rate
of 20 percent p.a. or more in 2002-03, up from around 54 percent in 1991-
92. A stark rise had occurred in the 'greater than 30 percent' range. In
contrast, the dominant interest rate range in West Bengal is between 10 to
15 percent, similar to what we observed for the WB-rn region in our
primary survey (Figure 3). However, a serious point of concern is the fact
that in this state too, there is a rise in the share of the 'greater than 30
percent' range in the total distribution between 1991-92 and 2002-03.
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Figure 2: Percentage Distribution of cash loans by interest rates for
rural households:  Andhra Pradesh, 1991-92 and 2002-03
Source: Based on data from AIDIS, 48th and 59th round (NSS Report
No. 420, 501)
Figure 3: Percentage Distribution of cash loans by interest rates for
 rural households:   West Bengal, 1991-92 and 2002-03
Source:  Based on data from AIDIS, 48th and 59th round (NSS Report
No. 420, 501)
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The clear evidence, both from primary and secondary data sources,
of high debt-burdens, increasing share of informal credit and a stringent
or rising interest rate structure in rural areas is critical for further agrarian
development as we have discussed above. The secondary trends disclosed
by the NSS all the more strengthens the case for a simultaneous debt relief
programme and public intervention to make the terms of trade more
favourable for agricultural producers. We have briefly summarized our
arguments below.
Summary:
The class analysis of the agricultural situation exposes the
differential impact of the neo-liberal economic policies on the Indian
peasantry. The conditions of  peasant production vary both across regions
and classes. In all regions of our study, including a primarily food growing
region like WB-rn, we find that the lower classes of the peasantry face a
drop in their incomes to drastically low levels, which can only support
consumption levels far below the required subsistence norms. In contrast,
in the commercial crop cultivating regions of Andhra Pradesh, some upper
peasantry classes also suffer from income depression. The fall in income is
also of such intensity that even after non-payment of their debts, it barely
allowed attainment of the required consumption levels for a good number
of households in these classes. On the other hand, the rare cases of upper
peasantry classes which are able to retain some surplus from cultivation
are just capable to cover their required consumption expenditures only,
i.e. they merely accomplish a simple reproduction of the peasant economy.
Although these peasant classes appropriate surplus labour, both directly
in the labour market and indirectly through exchange relations in the
land-lease market, the lack of effective demand for their products and
consequent low output prices does not allow them realization of that
surplus. Coupled with the simultaneous scaling down of government
operations with regard to inputs and infrastructure required by agriculture
over the reform period, this has hindered the process of capital
accumulation that is so essential for furthering agrarian development in
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the country. The prolonged stagnation and low investments in the primary
sector is precisely due to these reasons.
Given this specific nature of stagnation, there is a strong case for
stabilization of output prices for primary and food commodities in the
economy. For this purpose, there is an urgent need of enhancing the
procurement operations of the government, for both food and non-food
crops, and expand the public distribution system to pre-TPDS levels.
Since an overwhelming majority of the peasantry in the country are net
food-buyers, robust procurement and distribution operations are of
central importance for the real output prices faced by peasant producers
to come out of their deflationary trends and witness an upturn.
The magnitude of the constraint in the sphere of credit exchange
relations that has emerged for primary commodity producers also call for
a comprehensive debt relief policy. The ADWDRS has been a welcome step
towards that end. Nevertheless, there is need for more effective measures
that will negotiate the huge debt burden of farmers to informal sources. The
adoption of unilateral and misplaced targeting rules based on size of land
holdings in ADWDRS also limits the effectiveness of the debt relief policy.
A formulation of a more inclusive debt-amelioration policy by setting up a
debt-relief commission, strengthened by expansion of rural institutional
credit facilities and improved real returns for agriculture can effectively
release the primary sector from the clutches of deflation and indebtedness
into which it has got itself ensnared in recent times.
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